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INTRODUCTION
Partisan gerrymandering has moved to the front burner of
political reform once again. As the origin of the term “gerrymander”
reminds us, partisan bias in redistricting has been a serious concern
in the United States since the early nineteenth century.1 When
Baker v. Carr lowered the doctrinal barrier to more serious judicial
scrutiny of redistricting efforts,2 many initially hoped and expected
that the Court would eventually find a way to prohibit, or at least
severely limit, the practice of drawing district lines for partisan
advantage.3 That early optimism, however, faded when the Court
failed to endorse any specific partisan bias test in Davis v. Bandemer4 and Vieth v. Jubelirer,5 even as it reaffirmed at the same time
that partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable.
The wildly fluctuating interests of politicians in limiting partisan
gerrymandering illustrate the hoary political principle that “[w]here
you stand depends upon where you sit”; that is, political actors tend
to oppose redistricting reform when they control the line-drawing
process and to favor it when they do not.6 Republicans, historically
more skeptical about political reform than the Democrats, nonetheless led a decade-long charge in California to fix the state’s linedrawing process after a Democratic governor and state legislature
imposed a particularly contentious redistricting on them in 1982.7
1. For history on Elbridge Gerry’s original gerrymander, see ELMER C. GRIFFITH , THE
RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 16-21 (Arno Press 1974) (1907).
2. See 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962).
3. See Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of
Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1643-45 (1993) (discussing the “optimism of the
1960s” after the Baker decision).
4. See 478 U.S. 109, 119, 128-29 (1986).
5. See 541 U.S. 267, 310, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting
that the plurality’s holding of nonjusticiability was against controlling precedent).
6. See Rufus E. Miles, Jr., The Origin and Meaning of Miles’ Law, 38 PUB. ADMIN . REV.
399, 399 (1978) (discussing the origins and general applications of the principle).
7. See Robert Lindsey, Once Again, California Wrestles with the Problem of Redistricting,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 1983), http://www.nytimes.com/1983/10/27/us/once-again-californiawrestles-with-the-problem-of-redistricting.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/2VKN-M8WN]
(explaining the debate between California Republicans and Democrats over redistricting in
the 1980s). See generally Bruce E. Cain & Janet C. Campagna, Predicting Partisan
Redistricting Disputes, 12 LEGIS. STUD . Q. 265, 269 (1987) (noting state redistricting plans in
the early 1980s).
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By comparison, Democrats in the immediate post-Baker period were
more conflicted about legislative redistricting, in part because they
controlled more state legislatures than the Republicans.8 Hence, in
the 1980s, the Democrats were plaintiffs in Davis v. Bandemer9 and
defendants in Badham v. Eu.10 By the 1990s, political conditions
further dampened partisan redistricting concerns for both parties.11
Divided government had become more prevalent in the states,
blocking partisan designs and incentivizing incumbency protection
plans.12 The focus was redirected instead to how redistricting contributes to lower levels of competitiveness and bipartisan incumbent
lockups.13
Political circumstances and party positions have changed again
in recent years.14 Partisan polarization has increased sharply, raising the stakes of political contestation for state and federal offices.15
Thirty-seven states still allow their state legislatures to redraw
congressional lines.16 The Republicans, not the Democrats, currently
dominate the state legislatures and governorships.17 The concerns
8. See Philip Bump, How Your State’s Politics Have Shifted over the Years, in 49 Charts,
WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/09/11/49charts-that-tell-the-partisan-history-of-state-legislatures/?utm_term=.28bdc1c348df [https://
perma.cc/P3DF-JFX6] (graphing the shifts in the members of state legislatures by party,
both generally and specifically by state).
9. 478 U.S. at 113.
10. 694 F. Supp. 664, 665 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989).
11. See generally Mark D. Brewer, The Rise of Partisanship and the Expansion of Partisan
Conflict Within the American Electorate, 58 POL. RES. Q. 219, 219 (2005) (noting the
resurgence of partisanship in the 1990s).
12. See id. at 220; see also Mark A. Posner, Post-1990 Redistrictings and the Preclearance
Requirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990S
80, 106 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998) (explaining the impact incumbency protection concerns
had on almost all post-1990 plans).
13. See generally Michael Lyons & Peter F. Galderisi, Incumbency Reapportionment, and
U.S. House Redistricting, 48 POL. RES. Q. 857 (1995) (arguing that bipartisan redistricting
plans in the 1992 election benefitted incumbents more than partisan redistricting plans).
14. See Edward G. Carmines & Matthew Fowler, The Temptation of Executive Authority:
How Increased Polarization and the Decline in Legislative Capacity Have Contributed to the
Expansion of Presidential Power, 24 IND . J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD . 369, 369-70 (2017).
15. See id.
16. National Overview of Redistricting: Who Draws the Lines?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(June 1, 2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/national-overview-redistricting-whodraws-lines [https://perma.cc/ZH84-TRTF].
17. State Partisan Composition, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 1, 2017), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/partisan-composition.aspx [https://perma.cc/
BKF8-D236].
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of the Democratic Party’s good government faction in reforming the
redistricting process now more closely align with the interests of the
Party’s pragmatists in hedging against the likely Republican advantage in the 2021 round of legislative redistricting.18 Since the
probability of a partisan plan increases with single-party control of
the executive and legislative branches and decreases with divided
government,19 any imbalance in single-party control at the state
level could easily translate into decades-long electoral advantage for
the Republicans in the future. The short-term political answer for
the Democrats is to win back enough state legislative seats and
governorships in order to block adverse partisan plans in 2021.20
But given heightened partisanship and increasing exploitation of
voting laws for electoral advantage in the current era, there is also
a renewed interest in finding ways to curb partisan gerrymandering.21 The long-term legal project of persuading the courts to be
more interventionist in these matters requires diving back into and
resolving the thorny controversy over whether there is a manageable standard to identify unconstitutional partisan plans.22
Despite several decades of efforts by academics, reformers, and a
few political officials, there is still no consensus in the United States
about how best to measure and judge the partisan fairness of any
proposed districting plan.23 While it is a straightforward calculation
to identify seats-votes gaps at the end of a decade,24 it is more problematic to project them with a high degree of certainty into the
future when the district lines have just been drawn. Scholars have
offered a number of suggestions for measuring political fairness,

18. See generally Amber Phillips, The 2020 Redistricting War Is (Already) on, WASH . POST
(July 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/07/16/the-2020-redis
tricting-war-is-on/?utm_term=.565c9749e634 [https://perma.cc/8RH3-3Q2M] (discussing the
contentious race to control the redrawing of district lines and the Democratic desire to block
another Republican victory).
19. See Cain & Campagna, supra note 7, at 267, 271.
20. See Phillips, supra note 18.
21. See Brewer, supra note 11, at 219-20.
22. See infra Part I.
23. See infra Part I.B.
24. See generally Richard G. Niemi, The Relationship Between Votes and Seats: The
Ultimate Question in Political Gerrymandering, 33 UCLA L. REV. 185, 191-92 (1985) (noting
the Bandemer Court’s “casual[ ]” reference to the seats-votes gap after the election).
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including seats-votes bias, responsiveness, competitiveness, proportionality, and more recently, the efficiency gap.25 Yet how these
measures relate to one another is poorly understood: Are they duplicate measures that examine the same underlying political phenomenon, or do they tap different facets of partisan fairness? And if
there is no silver bullet measure, what judicial framework is then
possible for that messy reality?
We describe an important innovation in automated plan generation, aided by rapid computing advances, that holds enormous
promise for the enterprise of redistricting. Automated map generation technologies will continue to improve and become more accessible in the future. We provide an example of how they could be
used with the Parallel Evolutionary Algorithm for Redistricting
(PEAR), the most advanced automated redistricting algorithm to
date.26 PEAR is able to utilize more than a hundred thousand
processor cores on the Blue Waters supercomputer, the fastest research supercomputer in the world.27 Though much progress has
been made in the development and refinement of this important
tool, its potential—and extensive—applications are still being
developed.28 But even now, it proves to be both a powerful and
flexible tool. In this Article, we illustrate its enormous value with
two applications: to better understand how the various partisan
fairness measures interact with each other, and to draw maps that
are optimized along many such measures.
25. See infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
26. Yan Y. Liu et al., PEAR: A Massively Parallel Evolutionary Computation Approach
for Political Redistricting Optimization and Analysis, SWARM & EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION ,
Oct. 2016, at 78, 79. While we believe that PEAR is the most advanced approach, other wellrespected scholars have also been working to develop automated redistricting procedures. See
Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, BARD: Better Automated Redistricting, 42 J. STAT.
SOFTWARE, June 2011, at 1, 2; Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Cutting Through the Thicket:
Redistricting Simulations and the Detection of Partisan Gerrymanders, 14 ELECTION L.J. 331,
332 (2015) [hereinafter Chen & Rodden, Cutting Through the Thicket]; Jowei Chen &
Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in
Legislatures, 8 Q. J. POL. SCI. 239, 242, 248 (2013) [hereinafter Chen & Rodden, Unintentional
Gerrymandering]; Benjamin Fifield et al., A New Automated Redistricting Simulator Using
Markov Chain Monte Carlo 1-2 (Mar. 15, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://imai.
princeton.edu/research/files/redist.pdf [https://perma.cc/QSH9-VDXD]. The friendly rivalry
of these efforts gives us optimism about the future development of these tools.
27. About Blue Waters, NAT’L CTR. FOR SUPERCOMPUTING APPLICATIONS, http://www.ncsa.
illinois.edu/enabling/bluewaters [https://perma.cc/KC3U-FK8H].
28. See Liu et al., supra note 26, at 90.
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Our themes are as follows. First, we show how PEAR enables us
to generate a very large set of constitutionally feasible redistricting
plans in a given state.29 We can then identify extreme outcomes in
a reasonable bias framework by comparing the partisan bias scores
of any proposed redistricting plan with the range of scores in the
automated plans.30
Second, we use PEAR to study the intersection of the various
proposed partisan fairness measures, including seats-votes bias,
responsiveness, competitiveness, proportionality, and the more recently proposed efficiency gap.31 It appears that the concept of political fairness, like compactness, is multidimensional and cannot be
fully captured by a single number, which implies that any systematic evaluation of partisan bias should utilize several political
fairness measures.32 At a minimum, this would include at least one
measure of partisan bias plus a measure of competitiveness (or
responsiveness) as indicators of possible partisan or bipartisan gerrymandering.33
Third, we explore the value of a plural measures approach, more
affectionately known as the “everything bagel” approach.34 PEAR
can obviate the need to choose one measure of political fairness to
the exclusion of others.35 That said, this does not mean that courts
or any other redistricting bodies can escape the need to make value
judgments about the relative weight and threshold values of political fairness measures, or trade-offs between political fairness and
other redistricting goals such as preserving local district boundaries, respecting communities of interest, and the like.36

29. See infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
31. See infra Part I.B.
32. See infra Part I.B.
33. A partisan gerrymander can be biased toward one party with varying degrees of competitiveness. See Wendy K. Tam Cho & Yan Y. Liu, Toward a Talismanic Redistricting Tool:
A Computational Method for Identifying Extreme Redistricting Plans, 15 ELECTION L.J. 351,
362-63 (2016). A bipartisan plan can be either noncompetitive (for example, an incumbent
gerrymander) or competitive (the so-called fair, ideal plan). See id.
34. See infra Parts I.C-D.
35. See infra Part I.C.
36. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
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Lastly, in the Appendix to this Article, we demonstrate how a
reasonable bias approach could be utilized to identify a top set of
feasible alternatives with an example drawn from Minnesota.37
I. OUTLIER ANALYSIS AND AUTOMATED PLAN GENERATION
A manageable partisan bias test requires several elements. First
and foremost, it needs an agreed-upon political fairness measure.
Although scholars have proposed several, the Supreme Court has
not chosen one, only ruling that proportional representation is not
necessarily implied by the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.38 The most commonly discussed measures derive from a
symmetry concept: that is, in the same circumstances, partisan
unfairness should not disadvantage one party more than the other.39
King-Gelman bias scores40 and the efficiency gap are the most prominent examples of partisan symmetry measures.41
Beyond having measures that are mathematically and operationally sound, the second element of a manageable partisan bias test
is a specific threshold value that separates acceptable redistricting
from unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. When the Court
decided that “one person, one vote” was the underlying principle for
the weighting of each person’s vote,42 it had to determine how much
37. Bruce E. Cain et al., Appendix: A Reasonable Bias Approach to Gerrymandering: Using
Automated Plan Generation to Evaluate Redistricting Proposals, 59 WM . & MARY L. REV.
ONLINE 103 (2018).
38. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 156-60 (1971); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109, 130-32 (1986) (plurality opinion) (reaffirming the Whitcomb holding).
39. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties in achieving
this symmetry concept).
40. See generally Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Estimating Incumbency Advantage
Without Bias, 34 AM . J. POL. SCI. 1142 (1990) (explaining King-Gelman bias scores as a
means of measuring incumbency advantage).
41. The plaintiffs in Whitford v. Gill proposed the efficiency gap (EG) as a viable test of
partisan symmetry. 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court), argued,
No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017). As Professor Cho has demonstrated elsewhere, however, this
formulation has many odd properties. See Wendy K. Tam Cho, Measuring Partisan Fairness:
How Well Does the Efficiency Gap Guard Against Sophisticated as Well as Simple-Minded
Modes of Partisan Discrimination?, 166 U. PA . L. REV. ONLINE 17 (2017). For instance,
because it includes both winning and losing wasted votes, it assigns the same efficiency gap
value to very different distributions of partisan strength, and also counterintuitively penalizes
plans with competitive districts. See id.
42. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) (setting out the
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a district population could vary from perfect equality.43 In the end,
it settled on an “as nearly as practicable” rule for congressional
districts44 and a total population deviation of 10 percent for state
and local districts.45 Similarly, such a threshold value is required of
a partisan fairness measure that can separate acceptable from unacceptable partisan bias. Even if one were to say that a particular
political outcome measure should be optimized to its highest value—
the equivalent of determining that population deviation should be
as close to zero as possible—it would still be necessary to know what
is possible in order to know whether any given plan is at or even
near this optimal value.
In the case of population equality, the calibration of the exact
threshold was worked out over time in a series of cases.46 In other
words, the congressional and state/local population deviation thresholds were not handed down on a stone tablet from on high, but
rather evolved over a number of decisions into a gradual consensus
“one person, one vote” principle); see also, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964)
(reiterating the same principle stated in Justice Potter Stewart’s concurrence in Gray).
43. See, e.g., Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1967) (requiring a “satisfactory explanation” for deviations of 30 percent to 40 percent, but noting that “[d]e minimis deviations
are unavoidable”); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579 (“[S]ome deviations from the equal-population
principle are constitutionally permissible.”).
44. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 528 (1969).
45. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43 (1983); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315,
322, 324-25 (1973) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause merely requires a state to “make
an honest and good faith effort to construct districts ... as nearly of equal population as is
practicable” for its state and local districts, rather than the more stringent standard for
congressional districts). But see Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1325-28, 1347 (N.D. Ga.
2004) (three-judge court) (per curiam) (discussing the 10 percent “safe harbor” but still
striking down a “blatantly partisan and discriminatory” plan that fell within a 10 percent
deviation), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
46. There was—and still is—disagreement with political implications over whether the
right data in drawing equipopulous districts ought to be total population, voting age population, citizen voting age population, or even total registered voters. See Evenwel v. Abbott,
136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123 (2016) (holding that states can draw districts based on total population);
Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 505 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiffs had not
met their burden of proof in showing that counting based on potential eligible voters was the
proper districting measure); Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 774-75 (9th Cir.
1990) (deciding that, due to discriminatory effects, drawing based on total population was
more appropriate than using voting population, despite the argument that persons ineligible
to vote due to age or citizenship should not be counted). There is more uncertainty in state
and local population variance than in congressional election. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577-78
(explaining the different population deviation standards for congressional and state districting, and noting that more flexibility is given to state districting).
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that balanced the flexibility needed to accommodate other redistricting goals with a population constraint strict enough to prevent underpopulating or overpopulating districts to one party’s advantage
over another.47
Partisan fairness measures are more complex than population
deviation measures. Ideally, the critical thresholds of various partisan bias measures would be uniform nationally, but such a task is
made difficult by geographic and demographic realities.48 Partisans
are not randomly dispersed across geography.49 Rather, they cluster
in nonrandom ways, causing redistricting to produce natural partisan bias.50 The clearest and most intuitive example of this is in the
cities. The concentration of Democrats in urban areas makes districts comprising these usually compact areas “natural” Republican
gerrymanders.51 Democrats often win districts in cities by a supermajority of votes, thereby wasting votes that, if cast in more competitive districts, might help them win more seats.52
This problem is well documented.53 It is also one that the Court
has grappled with. Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurrence in Vieth
raised the concern that even neutral redistricting principles like
contiguity and compactness “would unavoidably have significant
political effect, whether intended or not.”54 In the area of redistricting, even criteria “neutral enough on its face, would ... benefit one

47. Systematically overpopulating the opposing party’s districts and underpopulating
one’s own party’s districts is in effect the original malapportionment abuse that led to the
Court intervening in Baker v. Carr. See 369 U.S. 186, 192 (1962). Systematically overpopulating and underpopulating districts along party lines within the allowable deviations
is potentially an equal protection violation. See Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1334, 1338.
48. See Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial
Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM . L. REV. 1325, 1353 (1987).
49. See Chen & Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering, supra note 26, at 240-41.
50. See id.
51. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 289-90 (2004) (plurality opnion).
52. See Nate Cohn, Why Democrats Can’t Win the House, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/upshot/why-democrats-cant-win.html?mcubz=0 [https://
perma.cc/G6F2-E72E] (discussing the Democratic tendency to win cities by a large margin
and yet fail to take control of the House); see also Bruce E. Cain, Assessing the Partisan
Effects of Redistricting, 79 AM . POL. SCI. REV. 320, 321 (1985).
53. See Micah Altman, Modeling the Effect of Mandatory District Compactness on Partisan
Gerrymanders, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 989, 1000-06 (1998); Chen & Rodden, Unintentional
Gerrymandering, supra note 26, at 240-41.
54. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 308-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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political party over another.”55 Justice Antonin Scalia, in the plurality opinion declining to find discernable and manageable standards for partisan gerrymandering claims, also spoke to the inherent
difficulty of detecting partisan influence in a redistricting plan.56 He
raised the example of the 2000 Pennsylvania congressional map
that produced a partisan effect against the Democrats, even though
the map was drawn “free from partisan gerrymandering.”57 “Whether by reason of partisan districting or not, party constituents may
always wind up ‘packed’ in some districts and ‘cracked’ throughout
others.”58
While the Court could take the view that a constitutional partisan
gerrymandering doctrine ought to correct for imbalances in the way
partisans are distributed across space, it is more likely that the
Court will find that natural gerrymanders are a permissible price
of our redistricting regime. Our system of districting sometimes
necessitates trading off values like seats-votes proportionality for
other values, such as the ability to reflect localized and community
interests.59 If we redistrict, we will have to accept some extant demographic patterns as a given.60 In that case, a measure of partisan
effect must be able to distinguish between plans that are merely a
product of geography and those that are the product of intentional
partisan manipulation. In the vast majority of cases, both are likely
to be in play. Therefore, a high-functioning measure of partisan

55. Id. at 309 (“District lines are rarely neutral phenomena. They can well determine
what district will be predominantly Democratic or predominantly Republican, or make a close
race likely.” (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973))); see also ROBERT H.
BORK , THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 88-89 (1990)
(documenting the author’s service as a special master responsible for redistricting Connecticut, and noting that his final plan so benefited the Democratic Party—albeit unintentionally—that the party chairman personally congratulated him); Altman, supra note 53, at
1000-06 (explaining that compactness is not a neutral standard, especially when groups have
distinct geographic distributions, as is the case with Democrats who are more likely to live
in high-density regions).
56. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 289 (plurality opinion).
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing ROBERT G. DIXON , JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT
IN LAW AND POLITICS 462 (1968)); Schuck, supra note 48, at 1359.
59. See Cho & Liu, supra note 33, at 355 (explaining the need for trade-offs to develop a
plan that satisfies the conflicting voices within a geographic area).
60. See, e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 289 (plurality opinion).
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effect must be able not only to parse out natural gerrymanders from
unnatural ones, but also to quantify the effects of each.
Cross-sectional and historical applications of partisan bias fail in
this crucial regard. The problem with both is that districts do not
start out on the same playing field. Consider, for instance, the
problem of comparing urban versus rural or suburban areas on a
competitiveness measure: districts in cities are often naturally
uncompetitive due to the predominance of city-dwelling liberals and
minority groups that live there.61 A plan that respects the urban
community of interests may score poorly on the competitiveness
metric through no fault of those who draw the lines. Indeed, given
the circumstances, even the most evenhanded line-drawer would
produce a highly uncompetitive district.62
No doubt line-drawers could be responsible for making an otherwise competitive district uncompetitive or vice versa. But, as it pertains to our discussion of what a functioning measure of partisan
fairness must be able to accomplish, knowing that a district scores
poorly on a competitiveness measure does not inform whether the
outcome is a product of partisan manipulation or merely reflects
the underlying political geography and communities of interest.63
And while the two scenarios can be distinguished with the help of
other evidence, courts are still unable to determine whether impermissible partisan gerrymandering is responsible for the observed
partisan bias in the challenged plan, and if so, by how much.64
This problem is no different with any proposed measure of partisan fairness. Consider the more recently advocated efficiency gap.65
An urban district likely uses Democratic votes inefficiently. Any
Democratic votes above and beyond the 50 percent necessary to win
are more efficiently spent in other more competitive districts, and
all votes in a losing district are considered wasted as well.66 Like the
above example, a poor efficiency gap fulfills only a descriptive purpose, but not a diagnostic one. One is left, once again, to rely on
61. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
65. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court),
argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
66. See Schuck, supra note 48, at 1359-60.
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extrinsic evidence in determining whether the partisan outcome is
a result of foul play or simply a natural consequence of the underlying demographics of the district.67
Indeed, the efficiency gap—or any other metric for that matter—
is not only flawed in this absolute sense, but also uninformative
even when used comparatively. Knowing that plan A has a higher
or lower efficiency gap score than plan B does not inform whether
the score in either plan is more likely to be produced by impermissible partisan gerrymandering. Without knowing about the natural
level of bias in any given geographic area, the scores are unreliable
as even a comparative measure of partisan bias.68
To be sure, there is a scenario in which the existing measures
would be useful: comparing two maps with exactly the same base
population. As we will later demonstrate, that is the intuition behind the logic of automated redistricting simulation.69 However,
recognizing the cross-state variance in political geography makes
the task of finding a uniform national standard a bit more complex,
but not necessarily impossible. It means looking for extreme departures from the mean of a given distribution rather than a magic
number on any or all fairness scores that would apply to all jurisdictions across the country.
To elaborate, a viable partisan fairness measure sorts maps into
two buckets—constitutionally permissible and impermissible—by
producing a cutoff: plans that score extremely poorly on the metric
are deemed constitutionally impermissible.70 But applying the same
cutoff to plans that contain vastly different political geography can
be misleading. Some places in the country may naturally score poorly on any of the proposed partisan bias metrics. Applying a national
cutoff to them would mean that line-drawers in those states would

67. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
68. The same thing is true of the measure of partisan symmetry. Indeed, the efficiency gap
is a measure of partisan symmetry. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 947. But once again,
plans may be naturally asymmetrical or symmetrical. A comparison of partisan symmetry
scores does not inform whether those scores are produced naturally, or as a result of impermissible gerrymandering.
69. See Cho & Liu, supra note 33, at 354.
70. See, e.g., id. at 360 (explaining how a set of “legal maps” was culled to retain only “feasible map[s]”).
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have less room to maneuver between drawing a permissible or
impermissible plan.
This could have perverse consequences in several directions. A
national average that includes states with little or no minority
population concentrations could serve as an excuse to split up some
existing minority influence districts or to avoid creating new ones.
Conversely, other places might naturally score well on a partisan
bias metric, providing them with the knowledge and incentive to
create mischief up to the allowable level. For these places, the cutoff
effectively provides them with a partisan gerrymandering credit.
Setting a very high cutoff nationally for all states in order to
provide more breathing space for states with concentrated urban
populations is also no solution. Aside from creating yet another
way to engage in partisan mischief by allowing packing levels that
are not warranted by the underlying political geography, it offends
the fundamental principle of fair treatment in a federal system by
imposing unrealistic expectations that derive from the political
conditions in other states.71
The stakes of developing a standard that accounts for natural
gerrymanders are thus not merely academic, but rather, are at the
core of our federal system of government. States, heterogeneous in
their geography and demographics, must nevertheless be held to a
uniform standard for redistricting purposes. Unconstitutional
partisan gerrymandering, if recognized, must proscribe the same
underlying bad conduct across the nation. Such is the challenge in
developing a constitutionally cognizable standard for partisan
fairness: How to both maintain a uniform national standard, while
accounting for gross heterogeneity in circumstances faced by state
legislatures?
The key to being able to do both is to develop a measure that
accounts for the effects of natural gerrymanders. Put otherwise, if
we can, in effect, control for the effects attributable to a particular
district’s underlying demographics, then districts can be compared
with one another on the same level playing field.72 In any case,
being able to isolate the natural gerrymandering effect bias will

71. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963).
72. See, e.g., Cho & Liu, supra note 33, at 359.
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help determine how much of the observed partisan bias is, in fact,
attributable to impermissible gerrymandering.
Such an effect can be isolated if we can determine the counterfactual: Where would the district lines be drawn in the absence of
partisan gerrymandering?73 Knowing such a state of the world
would allow us to calculate the distance between the counterfactual
and the observed state of the world.74 The difference between the
observed and the counterfactual plan could then be attributable to
artificial redistricting influences, such as the partisan biases of the
line-drawers.75 Deriving such counterfactual alternatives is therefore crucial to attributing and quantifying the observed bias in any
proposed plan.
Before we consider automated plan generation and the role it
could play in determining the counterfactual, what alternative tools
currently exist in redistricting litigation that might do the job? A
neutral expert, preferably blind to the actually produced map, could
draw a counterfactual plan.76 The goal of such an exercise would be
to determine what the plan would have looked like had there not
been any partisan influence. Indeed, courts commonly employ special masters in redistricting cases to draw remedial maps.77 Their
expertise ensures that they are competent in drawing maps, and
their theoretic neutrality ensures that partisan motivations do not
influence those maps.78
73. See id. (defining the counterfactual set of maps as “the set of plans that are at least
as good or better on non-partisan factors because there are known considerations, but do not
consider partisanship” (emphasis omitted)).
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. A variant of this that we will not discuss in any detail is to have the neutral
redistricting team draw maps that reveal the extremes with respect to different redistricting
values. So with respect to partisan bias, this would mean purposefully trying to create the
most plans that most favor one party and then the other. See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain et al.,
Sorting or Self-Sorting: Competition and Redistricting in California?, in THE NEW POLITICAL
GEOGRAPHY OF CALIFORNIA 245, 247 (Frédérick Douzet et al. eds., 2008). This approach has
the advantage of revealing the outside limits of partisan bias, but the disadvantage of not
revealing the overall distribution of bias across all possible plan options. Moreover, automated plan generation could do this exercise much more efficiently and quickly than individuals.
77. See, e.g., DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1410-11 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (three-judge
court), aff’d in part, dismissing appeal in part, 515 U.S. 1170 (1995); Puerto Rican Legal Def.
& Educ. Fund, Inc. v. Gantt, 796 F. Supp. 681, 685 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (three-judge court) (per
curiam).
78. See Puerto Rican Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 796 F. Supp. at 685 (discussing the
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Yet, relying on an expert to determine such a counterfactual has
crippling pitfalls. As the experience with independent redistricting
commissions and even court panels demonstrates, neutrality is especially elusive when it comes to redistricting.79 More critically, a
data point of one can be highly unreliable and idiosyncratic, especially in an enterprise as complex as redistricting. Many—easily
millions of viable and neutral maps—could be drawn.80 How would
a court know whether the particular map drawn by a neutral expert
is typical of the kind of map that neutral experts, as a whole, would
draw?81
Ideally, then, a court would have at its disposal a survey of all the
maps that all neutral experts would draw. Instead of finding the
single-but-elusive counterfactual, the spectrum of viable maps better constitutes the baseline or natural set of maps against which to
compare the observed map.82 But hiring one special master, let alone several, comes at a steep cost.83 Hiring a group of them to draw
maps and then to take an average, therefore, only makes sense in
principle and certainly not in practice.
This is where automated plan generation can offer some unique
advantages. A computer program essentially substitutes for a very
large body of neutral experts and the viable, neutral maps they
draw.84 By programming neutral redistricting criteria, such as the
preservation of extant communities, compactness, contiguity, and
adherence to one-person, one-vote guidelines,85 a computer algorithm can generate a very large set of neutral redistricting plans
that by design are not influenced by partisanship, and take as given
the natural gerrymandering effect—if any—of the underlying
appointed special master’s recognized need for particular expertise from a university
professor).
79. See generally Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121
YALE L.J. 1808 (2012) (arguing that, while successful to some degree, independent citizen
commissions have not eliminated partisan suspicions).
80. See Liu et al., supra note 26, at 78 (noting the significant number of plans that could
be drawn within legal parameters).
81. Formulating a baseline with the help of many, as opposed to a single or a small set of
maps, is analytically crucial.
82. See Cho & Liu, supra note 33, at 353-54.
83. Cf. Puerto Rican Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 796 F. Supp. at 685 (noting the need
to hire experts beyond the appointed special master due to significant time restraints).
84. See Liu et al., supra note 26, at 79, 89.
85. See, e.g., id. at 79-81, 83, 91.
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demographics.86 Indeed, the algorithm is better than a large group
of experts. Humans, despite all attempts to be neutral, may inject
subconscious and latent biases. The algorithm operates purely
based on the parameters that are imposed. And, as long as the algorithm is transparent, courts, scholars, and litigants can examine
and critique the soundness of the parameters used in the map generation algorithm.
When we refer to a very large set of redistricting plans, we truly
mean a very large set of such plans. Redistricting is an activity
containing many degrees of freedom: there is an astronomically
large number of redistricting plans that satisfy basic redistricting
principles.87 Most of this set is uninteresting to us because while
these redistricting plans meet minimal legal requirements, they do
not represent the set of plans a human might draw.88 PEAR, however, is able to produce not simply large numbers of random plans,
but random high-quality redistricting plans.89 Using this corpus of
reasonably imperfect plans (in other words, plans that meet or
exceed the threshold values on a set of redistricting fairness
criteria),90 we can derive a good understanding of what the viable
counterfactual options are in a given state at a given time, and
begin to define how far out on the tail of the distribution a plan can
go before it is deemed extreme.91 This same exercise can be used for
any of the criteria, including partisan bias and competitiveness.92
The core contribution of an automated plan generation approach
is producing a large set of legally viable maps with respect to multiple criteria. Once the corpus has been generated, there are many
potential ways to use it in determining the partisan effects of the
challenged plan. Without claiming to exhaust all possibilities, the
next Section of this Article attempts to map out some of the possible
ways forward.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id. at 91.
See Cho & Liu, supra note 33, at 354-55.
See id. at 355.
See Liu et al., supra note 26, at 79.
See Cho & Liu, supra note 33, at 355.
See id. at 363-64.
See Liu et al., supra note 26, at 89.
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A. Getting to a Reasonable Partisan Bias Standard
Developing a rule for courts to detect gerrymandering in legislative plans will likely have to follow the path of the population deviation rules: that is, a case-by-case evolution of a benchmark definition of the distribution tail given the natural disparities in any
particular geopolitical setting.93 Let us say, for example, that a court
was looking at a rough seats-votes proportionality measure as one
of its indications of bias. One possibility is simply to compare the
seat share in the challenged plan to those in the counterfactuals.
The counterfactual plans may contain plans with a wide variety of
projected seat shares. But knowing where the challenged plan
stands compared to the counterfactuals will be informative in
discovering whether the seat share observed in the challenged plan
is unusual or pedestrian. If the vast majority of plans generated by
neutral redistricting principles would produce the same seat share
as that in the challenged plan, then one cannot claim that the
challenged plan has a partisan effect above and beyond what the
geography and demographics would produce. If, on the other hand,
the challenged plan has a seat share that is rarely seen in the
computer-generated plans, that is convincing evidence that the
observed bias in the challenged map is unlikely to be a product of
the underlying geography.94 One could do a similar comparison with
the other measures of partisan bias95 by asking the question of how
far the proposed plan score is from the mean score of the automated
plan distribution, expressed perhaps in terms of standard deviations.
Adopting this approach, critical decisions would have to be made
about how to draw the line between permissible and impermissible
deviations from the counterfactual plans. Any partisan gerrymandering doctrine that the Court adopts will presumably allow states
to draw maps that deviate some from the counterfactual plans.96
Strict adherence is not likely to be required. The critical question in

93.
94.
95.
96.

See Cho & Liu, supra note 33, at 364.
See Liu et al., supra note 26, at 89.
See id. at 80-82, 89-90.
See Cho & Liu, supra note 33, at 363-64.
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applying this method then becomes: How much deviation is too
much?
Like in many areas of law, courts face an age-old dilemma in
whether to choose rules or standards.97 While any rule would be
inevitably arbitrary, it has the virtues of clarity, transparency, and
predictability, enabling line-drawers to conform ex ante. One example of a rule for identifying partisan extremity could be: a redistricting plan cannot yield an expected seats-votes share or partisan
bias score that occurs in only 5 percent or less of the machinegenerated maps.98 An expected seat share or bias score that far from
the mean would be good evidence that the map has a partisan effect
that is both extreme and unnecessary given the large number of
viable alternatives. Moreover, the partisan bias in the challenged
map would demonstrably not be a result of the underlying political
geography, as the comparison plans would be based on the same
area.99
What if courts decide to go with standards instead? For instance,
the height of the cutoff could depend on the existence or persuasiveness of additional evidence. Where the challenged map stands relative to the simulated maps could be considered simply as one piece
of evidence in a more holistic analysis of partisan intent, actions
line-drawers may have taken, and features of the challenged maps.
While standards provide less predictability, risk aversion on the
part of line-drawers may in fact provide an incentive for more
responsible redistricting outcomes.

97. For a proposed definition of rules versus standards, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559-60 (1992).
98. One could also imagine having a safe-harbor percentile within which a map could not
be deemed to have partisan effects.
99. Another possibility is to focus not on the percentile, but rather, on the absolute
distance between the vote share of the median map generated by the simulation approach and
that of the challenged map. Suppose the median map generated by simulation generates five
Republican seats and five Democratic seats, and the challenged map generates one Republican seat and nine Democratic seats. Courts would determine that a partisan effect exists if
a certain distance between the simulated and observed outcome is breached. But any such
rule devised must be scaled to treat districts of different sizes with different numbers of seats
similarly.
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B. Evaluating Existing Measures of Partisan Fairness
In addition to using PEAR as a simulation tool, it can also serve
the scholarly community in providing better analyses of redistricting. We present one such application by using automated plan generation to ascertain how different measures of political fairness that
scholars have proposed over the years compare to one another.
There is a rich and growing academic interest in the development
of a measure of partisan fairness. Scholars have offered a number
of suggestions, including seats-votes bias,100 responsiveness,101 competitiveness,102 proportionality,103 and more recently, the efficiency
gap.104 This is in part fueled by the Court’s sustained ambivalence
over whether to accept any existing measure as a standard of partisan fairness for partisan gerrymandering claims.105 Over the years,
this has produced a panoply of partisan fairness measures, some
purporting to have solved the golden riddle.
However, the growth in the number of measures proposed is not
matched by the size of an evaluative literature on how the measures
relate to one another. Are they duplicative or overlapping measures,
or do they tap different facets of partisan fairness? We find that, like
compactness measures, the choice of different measures results in
widely varying outcomes.106 There is not as much overlap between
efficiency, bias, and proportionality, or responsiveness and competitiveness as one might expect.107 Each individual measure, instead
of singularly capturing the concept of partisan fairness, may simply
be picking up on only one facet of the ideal.

100. See Cain, supra note 52, at 321-23; Bernard Grofman, Measures of Bias and Proportionality in Seats-Votes Relationships, 9 POL. METHODOLOGY 295, 296 (1983); Gary King
& Robert X. Browning, Democratic Representation and Partisan Bias in Congressional Elections, 81 AM . POL. SCI. REV. 1251, 1251-53 (1987); Niemi, supra note 24, at 186.
101. See, e.g., Cho & Liu, supra note 33, at 360, 362, 364.
102. Cain & Campagna, supra note 7, at 266-67, 271, 273; Cho & Liu, supra note 33, at 36263.
103. See, e.g., Cho & Liu, supra note 33, at 360-62.
104. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and
the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 834, 837-38 (2015).
105. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
106. See infra Figure 1.
107. See infra Figure 1.
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While there are doubtless other ways to study the interaction
between the various measures of partisan fairness, we employ
PEAR for this exercise. Again, PEAR is able to draw a set of maps
that comport with neutral standards of redistricting, such as compactness, contiguity, and equal population.108 We run the algorithm
on Minnesota’s congressional redistricting. What is new here compared to the use of PEAR in producing simulated counterfactuals is
that in addition to drawing maps that satisfy neutral criteria, we
explicitly include political fairness measures.
What the algorithm produces, as a result, is a very large set of
viable maps that perform well on the one measure of partisan
fairness that we have included in the algorithm.109 Say, for instance,
we choose competitiveness as the measure of interest: the algorithm
then generates a very large corpus of maps that score well on competitiveness. We can repeat this process for other fairness measures:
seats-vote bias, responsiveness, proportionality, and the efficiency
gap. We then have five sets of maps, each of which scores high on
one of the aforementioned measures.
In order to determine whether two different measures measure
similar phenomena, we look at each corpus in turn. What we are
interested in is whether maps that score highly on one measure also
score highly on another measure. To take an example, if every map
that does well on competitiveness also scores highly on the efficiency gap, that would suggest that the two measures are duplicates. If,
on the other hand, every map that scores highly on proportionality
also has a poor efficiency gap, it would mean that the two measures
tap different features.
Since the efficiency gap has generated much interest through its
litigation in Whitford,110 we present our findings comparing each of
the other partisan fairness measures with the efficiency gap. In
Figure 1, we have four histograms showing the frequency of plans
that score at various points along the measure on the vertical axis.

108. See Liu et al., supra note 26, at 79.
109. See id. at 89.
110. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court),
argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
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Figure 1. Comparing the EG Against Other Measures
Figure 1a. EG v. Bias
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Figure 1d. EG v. Proportional Representation

The first histogram compares the bias scores of the maps that
were optimized using the bias measure with the bias scores of the
maps that were optimized using the efficiency gap measure.111 Each
histogram also shows the optimal and the current plan scores for
purposes of comparison. We then repeat the exercise for responsiveness, competitiveness, and seats-vote proportionality.112 We have
also done a full comparison of all measures with each other, but in

111. See supra Figure 1a.
112. See supra Figures 1b-d.
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the interest of space, we will only allude to what we found in those
histograms. The full set of histograms is available online.113
Since political fairness has at least two dimensions (corresponding to partisan plans that favor one party over the other and bipartisan plans that favor incumbents over challengers),114 we might
expect more overlap between measures from the same category; that
is, bias, proportionality, and the efficiency gap for identifying partisan advantage versus responsiveness and competitiveness for bipartisan lockup potential. The point of this exercise is not to weigh
in on the comparative merits of any particular measure versus the
other, but only to test the simple question of whether optimizing on
these measures yields different or very similar results. If they yield
different outcomes, then it suggests that courts and other entities
will have to choose between these measures or develop an approach
that utilizes some combination of them.115 We advocate for the latter.
What do we discover? We find that choosing to optimize on any
given measure as opposed to another does indeed lead to different
conclusions about the best districts. This is true even within the two
categories of fairness (partisan advantage versus bipartisan lockup).
The bars with lines slanting up to the northeast in the above graphs
show the distribution of scores on the indicated measures.116 In the
first graph, those bars display the distribution of the bias scores for
all the maps optimized by the bias measure plus the compactness,
contiguity, and equal population measures.117 The bars with lines
slanting down toward the southeast are the bias scores for the maps
that were optimized according to the efficiency gap.118 The northeast
slanting bars in the other histograms correspond to the maps optimized in the same way with the measure listed on the horizontal
axis, and the bars with lines slanting southeast are as before, the
efficiency gap optimized maps.119

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Cain et al., supra note 37.
See, e.g., Cho & Liu, supra note 33, at 352.
See infra Part I.C.
See supra Figure 1.
See supra Figure 1a.
See supra Figure 1a.
See supra Figures 1b-d.
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As Figure 1 shows, there is only some overlap between all of the
measures and the efficiency gap, and in all cases, optimizing with
any given measure produces better scores in terms of that measure
than the efficiency gap. This is true even of bias and the efficiency
gap, even though they both purport to measure partisan symmetry.120 The same holds true when the exercise is flipped and we
optimize on the efficiency gap and then score the bias optimized
maps by the efficiency gap scores: there is only a partial overlap in
the top sets of the two measures.121 The same conclusion holds for
the overlap between all of the measures, not just with the efficiency
gap.122
In short, this exercise demonstrates what should surprise no one.
Partisan fairness is a multifaceted concept. It encompasses a variety
of values that can be measured in several different ways. The person who programs the computer has to choose or prioritize both among these core values and the measures of them. Some may care
more about competitive elections where both parties have a chance
at winning a seat.123 They may want changes in votes to reflect
changes in seats. Others may care more about whether the party
affiliations of the elected representatives reflect the underlying distribution of votes cast for each party.124 Still others may put more of
a premium on whether a particular map is fair enough to both sides:
whether both sides would have a similar chance at winning the
seats if they have similar levels of statewide support.125 While all of
these ideas are embedded into the concept of political fairness, they
are also, in many cases, distinct. Perhaps no single measure will
capture all the richness of what partisan fairness means.
120. See supra Figure 1a.
121. See Cain et al., supra note 37, at 107.
122. See id. at 104-19.
123. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 230 F. Supp. 2d 998,
1002 (D. Ariz. 2002) (three-judge court) (noting that the Arizona Constitution requires the
Independent Redistricting Committee to “create competitive districts”).
124. See, e.g., Adam Cox, Commentary, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 765-66 (2004) (attempting to adapt the single-member district model to
the benefits of proportionality by reflecting the vote percentages in the seats gained).
125. See, e.g., Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 852 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge
court), argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017) (disputing a map that would have allowed the
Republicans to maintain a majority even with only 48 percent of the statewide vote, compared
to the 54 percent of the vote that Democrats would need to win the majority).
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C. Optimizing Plans Along All Dimensions of Partisan Fairness
Since partisan fairness is not aptly captured by one of these proposed measures, how should redistricting bodies and courts choose
among them? This Article does not purport to answer that question
definitively. Our hope is merely to begin to evaluate ways to proceed
when we recognize that political fairness has multiple dimensions
and different ways of measuring them. What we have shown to date
suggests that the different measures make unique contributions in
capturing the complex concept of partisan fairness. Selecting one
measure over all of the others necessitates sacrifices.
However, it is possible to combine these measures to produce a
fuller picture. PEAR allows us to select plans that are optimized
over multiple criteria: that is, an “everything bagel” approach to fair
redistricting. In addition to so-called formal redistricting criteria
such as equal population, contiguity, and compactness, this approach seamlessly handles multiple measures of political fairness,
optimizing over all of them simultaneously.126 This process involves
several basic steps. First, we have to choose the redistricting criteria we seek to optimize and the relative weights we choose to assign
to each. In this case, we assign equal weight to each, recognizing
that they could instead be assigned different weights if that was
agreed upon.
Second, we designate the starting value for the optimization,
which in this example is the redistricting index score associated
with Minnesota’s current congressional district lines. An advantage of starting with the status quo districts is that they were presumably minimally valid in terms of state and federal criteria at the
time they were adopted. The algorithm then optimizes by creating
a set of new plans that meets or exceeds the redistricting criteria
score of the current plan. In this setup, we are optimizing over the
total score of all of the criteria.127

126. See Liu et al., supra note 26, at 82.
127. It is thus possible for the value of any specific criteria to be lower on one of the
generated plans than for the status quo plan, as we are optimizing over the score of all of the
criteria. However, it would also be possible to set up the process so that no plan scores lower
than the current plan on any specific redistricting criterion.
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Figure 2. Optimizing Plans on All Measures
Figure 2a. Combined Fairness Measures v. Bias
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Figure 2b. Combined Fairness Measures v. Responsiveness
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Figure 2c. Combined Fairness Measures v. Competitiveness
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Figure 2d. Combined Fairness Measures v. Proportional
Representation
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Figure 2e. Combined Fairness Measures v. EG

In Figure 2, the bars with lines slanting down to the southeast in
the graphs represent the maps generated by the algorithm that
optimizes along all of the measures plus the two formal criteria (the
everything bagel plans), while the bars with lines slanting up to the
northeast represent the scores of those maps optimized along only
a single political fairness measure plus the formal criteria. The
vertical dimension represents the number of plans that attain the
various values of the measure as displayed along the horizontal
axis.
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Figure 2a illustrates an important point. It compares the set of
maps using the combined fairness measure with the maps that were
optimized using bias only. As we might expect, the bias scores of the
maps that only optimize on the bias measure cluster much closer to
the optimal value than the ones that optimize over all of the political fairness criteria. This is because, as noted earlier, the different
political fairness criteria measure several dimensions of fairness.128
In other words, the combined measure trades off bias with the other
fairness and formal criteria measures to achieve an overall higher
score.
These trade-offs seem particularly strong for the bias measure as
a number of the everything bagel plans in the first histogram fall
below the current plan’s bias scores.129 This appears to be less of a
problem with the other fairness criteria.130 Note also that because
all of the single fairness criteria plans are traded off with the formal nonpolitical criteria, some of those automated plans also fall
below the current plan’s score.131 A simple way to handle this is to
say that a plan must fall in the reasonable bias interval between the
current and optimal lines in order to ensure that any chosen plan is
at least as good or better in every dimension of fairness as the
current districts.
The histograms for competitiveness and responsiveness show the
closest correspondence between the single criteria optimization and
the everything bagel plans.132 This suggests less trade-off with the
other criteria than we observe with partisan-bias-only plans.133 Most
of the everything bagel plans in all the histograms are located in the
reasonable bias, safe-harbor zone between the current plan and the
optimal plans.
In short, automated plan generation offers the option of combining both political fairness and formal criteria to generate maps that
meet or exceed the values of the maps that were previously approved by the courts. Because the maps derive from the same
natural geography, they provide an accurate representation of what
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
See supra Figure 2a.
See supra Figures 2b-e.
See supra Figure 2.
See supra Figures 2b-c.
See supra Figure 2a.
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is feasible given the particular demographic circumstances in a given state.
D. Applications of PEAR in Redistricting
Aside from providing a tool for the courts and others to judge the
merits of various proposed plans on a basis that takes into account
natural demographic concentrations, PEAR can also be used by
redistricting commissions, court masters, and other bodies charged
with the task of generating redistricting plans. One straightforward
application of PEAR would be assisting courts when they are tasked
with drawing remedial maps. In this case, a court could simply
follow the process outlined above, taking the existing lines as a
starting point and generating alternatives that are at least as good
or better. This would greatly reduce time and expense for the courts.
Alternatively, courts could also decide simply to choose the plan
with the best combined score from the set of plans that satisfy all
other criteria thresholds. Such an approach would have the advantage of uniformity in standards for remedial plans across jurisdictions. Or, courts could choose blindly and randomly from the
top set (that is, the set of plans that meets the minimum criteria).
Such uncertainty might incentivize parties in the state legislature
to come to an agreement rather than face the vagaries of a plan
chosen from a large distribution of reasonably fair outcomes.
Similarly, generating a feasible set of plans could save time and
trouble for citizen redistricting commissions. The Arizona Redistricting Commission is required by the state constitution to initiate
its redistricting process by using compact, contiguous, and equally
populated districts (but disregarding the other constitutional and
statutory requirements) as the baseline of all subsequent negotiations and modifications.134 This has spawned two decades of litigation about how far the final plan can deviate from the initial
bare-bones foundations.135 They might consider a process that
starts, as our method did, from the criteria values of the status quo
134. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. II, § 1, cl. 14.
135. See, e.g., Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1306-07 (2016);
Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 121 P.3d 843,
869-70 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam).
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districts. Or, to take another example, the California Redistricting
Commission starts from a staff-generated plan after receiving considerable public input.136 Having staff-generated districts raises partisan suspicions about the true neutrality of the staff.137 Starting
with one or more automated plans would avoid this problem.
Still, neither a court nor a redistricting commission can avoid
making the determination of a threshold level of the partisan fairness score.138 But it should not be difficult for either the court or
redistricting commissions to do so, provided they do it early in the
process. They could either start from the values of the plan they
designed in the previous decade, or they could take an outlier approach, setting the threshold values to exclude the tails of the automated plan distribution—for example, the plans that fall into the 5
percent most extreme partisan scores in either party’s direction.
CONCLUSION
This Article has two main takeaway points. First, automated
generation of a large number of viable plans is a better way to judge
the fairness of proposed alternative districting plans than any
standard based on time series or cross-sectional data. Political
demography is dynamic, changing over time, and varying from state
to state. Shifts in immigration policy, migration patterns, and
differential birth rates across various racial and ethnic groups both
within and across states make out-of-time and out-of-place comparisons highly problematic. Without taking into account natural inefficiencies in the geographic concentration of different segments of
the population, it is impossible to gauge whether a plan that scores
well or poorly by some nationally derived average is natural or
intentionally imposed by those drawing the lines. It is not enough
to say that a plan has a high or low score. It is necessary to determine whether that score is representative or reasonable within the
context of possible plans, or whether it is an extreme outlier that
needs to be examined closely.

136. See Cain, supra note 79, at 1824-27.
137. See id. at 1829.
138. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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Second, the Court needs to avoid locking in any one particular
measure of political fairness because these measures not only have
to be traded off with other formal criteria but also with other fairness measures that tap other dimensions of what is considered fair
overall. Measures of partisan symmetry alone do not capture bipartisan lockup plans for incumbents. Different measures of either
partisan bias or lockup can lead to different outcomes if they are
used to guide plan generation. We have shown that it is possible to
use all of the measures simultaneously in order to gain a more complete perspective of competing alternative plans. We also show that
one sensible way to proceed is to take the values of the current plan
as the starting point, and then accept an alternative that sits in the
reasonable bias interval between the current plan and one with an
optimal score. Of course, it is also possible to insist on a plan that
has the optimal score. That is a choice for the courts, redistricting
commissions, and citizens of a given state to decide.
It is natural and human for any measure’s proponents to sell
their product enthusiastically. After all, it is the ticket to fame and
glory in academic circles and the reform community. But setting
into stone a flawed and partial measure only invites gaming and
manipulation by savvy partisan actors. Rather, we suggest that the
standards should develop organically through adjudicating actual
cases and controversies, as the “one person, one vote” standards did,
so that we might discover more about which measures are most
applicable to political geographies and citizen expectations. Over
time, we can also expect automated plan generation to improve in
efficiency and accessibility. The computing power of the Blue Waters
supercomputer will be on laptops in the future. It is better to build
the legal architecture around that future than to settle for and
ensconce partial and flawed approaches that draw on soon-to-be
passé technologies.

